Steven T. Katz
Reconsidering Where We Are After October 7
October 7 has forced the intensive reconsideration of two fundamental issues that are separate but inter-related. The first is related to Israeli security; the second concerns the present state of the American Jewish community.
National Security
The events of October 7 radically unsettled, if they did not altogether destroy, defining ideas many people have lived with throughout their entire adult lives. Foremost, and most consequential among them, was the certainty that the state of Israel was militarily secure. Raised on tales of the 1948 and 1967 wars, plus the experience of 1973 and the various intifadas, most Jews and other pro-Israel groups were confident that Israel had constructed a tight defensive cordon around its borders. Now it appears that this view was mistaken and that Israel is more vulnerable than had been appreciated. Clearly Israeli politicians, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his rightwing cabinet, have made a series of fundamental errors in their management of Israel’s defense. Though to be honest, it is not the fault of the Right alone.
Regarding this crucial matter, six things need to be observed:
1. Israel’s radical policies in the West Bank led to the movement of troops away from Gaza. Thus, politics dictated policies involving security, something that should never happen.
2. Israeli intelligence, the almost mythically successful Shin Bet and Mossad, along with other units of Israel’s intelligence program, have been shown to be all too human, with the serious consequence that the intelligence services have lost their crucial intimidation value. The “mystique” linked to Israel’s putative national omniscience in security and intelligence matters has been shattered. The belief that Israel was always one step ahead of Palestinian militants and their allies in Lebanon and Syria, all backed by Iran, was mistaken. So, now, instead of a sense of security, a new, high level of anxiety has been created in Israel (and elsewhere).
3. The policy of Palestinian “containment,” and the strategy of playing the Palestinian Authority off against Hamas, dominant in Israeli military and political planning for the past two decades, has been exposed as a terrible and very costly error.
4. There needs to be a minute, thorough, honest reconsideration of Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians. Israel cannot continue to operate on a plan that only involves domination of the Palestinian people. Principled thought must be given to the topic of how the Palestinians can, or will, respond to Israeli policy. However, at the same time this concern is profoundly problematic because the war has, on the one hand, reinforced Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews, and, on the other, severely hardened Israeli attitudes towards the “Palestinian problem.”
5. Arrogance, as in 1973, has again led Israeli institutions and individuals charged with national security to seriously miscalculate the security situation. We now understand that the Palestinian militias have much greater capacity to do harm than has previously been recognized.
6. Last, but not least, Israel has learned, at great cost, that technology (wired walls topped with video cameras) cannot alone provide the needed security. A new strategy is required.
Thankfully, the IDF has still been strong enough to overcome the nation’s enemies, but the idea of how to provide full Israeli security—elusive as this idea is—needs to be rethought. The Israeli people—and their supporters in the diaspora—do not want to live in a situation where Israel’s defense continually involves the type of massive intervention that we have been witnessing in Gaza for the past six months.
Moreover, this concern for the safety of Israel has profound implications for the way forward at the end of the current conflict in Gaza. The United States and many European countries are now projecting a postwar situation that will include the creation of a Palestinian state, the long-discussed “two-state solution.” But given the lethal structure that Hamas, under close observation by Israel, was able to create in Gaza, what kind of threat would an independent Palestine state represent? Can one possibly assure the demilitarization of such a state? In considering this subject, it must always be remembered that Israelis need not only to be safe but to feel safe. Otherwise, who will stay in the country? Also, is it reasonable, given Hamas’ basic beliefs and stated threats toward the Jewish state, to assume that they will agree to recognize the existence of such a state?
The events that led up to this war, that continue to exist during the war, and, probably, will be the case after the war, are set against the background of a profoundly divided Israeli body politic. The events of October 7 have made the highly corrosive corruption in Israeli politics even more evident. More specifically, it has revealed how existing radicalized and dishonorable political circumstances have profound implications for national security. Prime Minister Netanyahu and his rightwing and religious allies have nearly completely abandoned any concern with, and for, the general good. Of course, it is to be understood that different constituencies will, unfortunately, define the “general good” in self-interested ways.
There is an urgent need for an end to the selfish ideological politics now dominating the Israeli government, as well as the looting of the national treasury (budget) by the Haredi segment of the population. Aside from the absolute need to win the current war—recognizing that what this entails and what this legitimates is not altogether clear—the issue of political integrity and responsibility is the most pressing internal matter now facing the Jewish state.
The American Jewish Community
The second major concern that has arisen after October 7 relates to the condition of the American Jewish community, in particular, the relationship between it and other groups and organizations in America. Related to this highly complex topic, I would make six comments.
1. The shocking, overwhelming, and unanticipated anti-Israel and antisemitic reaction to the war indicates that the leadership of major Jewish organizations failed to correctly understand the nature of the relationship existing between American Jewry and other communities in the United States. Almost entirely focused on the dangers posed by the extreme-right, mainstream Jewish leaders seriously underestimated, and were virtually silent about, the antisemitism extant in the Black, Muslim, and “woke” communities.
Simply put, the diverse relationships between the Jewish community and the Black and Muslim communities have been badly mismanaged by Jewish leaders because the governing Jewish strategy was based on the notion that Jewish support of Black and Muslim American agendas would be met with reciprocal support for the Jewish community. In fact, this understanding of the dialectic of outreach has now been shown to be seriously mistaken as the most vociferous anti-Israel response to October 7 has come from these groups of people.
The same applies to the “progressives,” whose invention and propagation of Diversity, Equity, Inclusion (DEI) and Critical Race Theory throughout the entire American educational system, and beyond, is, and will be, enormously destructive to Jewish interests. These paradigms divide American society into oppressed and oppressor groups, and the Jews are defined as “white adjacents” and thus oppressors. DEI’s demand for equal results instead of the classic liberal ideal of equal opportunities means, by definition, that Jews will be denied professorial appointments, spots on corporate boards, and in many other places. Most especially, DEI has already shown itself to yield highly negative results for Jews on colleges campuses. This issue is, however, many-sided as the role of an ethos of diversity must be understood, i.e., many previously unrepresented minorities are now in play. Thus, diversity is not, per se, antisemitism. However, in many instances the two have come together to create specific examples of toxic opinion and behavior. Given the great importance of education to Jewish success in America, this is a matter that needs to be closely scrutinized.
2. In light of what has occurred, there needs to be an understanding of, and a “zero tolerance” for, Muslim, Black, and “woke” antisemitism. Yes, there is a difference to be made between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, but all too often a double standard singles out Israel for wrongs that involve the recycling of traditional antisemitic themes, for example, the “Blood Libel,” that are directed only at Israel.
3. More broadly, Jews and non-Jews alike have been shocked by the outpouring of raw hatred in American society, most notably on college campuses. However, it is important to appreciate that most non-Jewish students and non-Jewish faculty did not participate in this explosion of antisemitism. Yet it is also important to recognize that those responsible for making policy at higher education institutions have often treated antisemitism and the abuse of Jewish students with a less stringent standard than is applied in other instances of prejudice. What would never be tolerated vis-à-vis Black students, or gay students, is regularly—one might almost say normatively—tolerated where Jewish students are concerned. Harvard would never allow a public attack on students in any of the non-Jewish groups just mentioned, but when its president was asked about the tolerance of talk of “genocide” of the Jews, her reply was “it depends on the context.” The “wokism” that has come to dominate colleges and universities must be openly and vigorously opposed by lawsuits and government agencies.
4. With regard to the larger topic of American “exceptionalism,” it is evident that this notion needs to be further explored and re-examined when it comes to the treatment of Jews, because it has very real consequences. Such a review will unavoidably influence how the Jewish community and individual Jews invest their time and resources and respond to the question of aliyah. Many have already decided that the current outpouring of antisemitism is clear proof against the “exceptionalism” thesis. But, upon careful reflection, the relevant evidence here is, in fact, much more ambiguous. For even with the many current expressions of Jew hatred, America represents a significant deviation from prior historical Jewish experience. In defense of exceptionalism one needs to note: a) President Biden has publicly declared that he is a Zionist; b) the number of Jewish senators and congressmen who support Israel is disproportionally high; c) a recent Pew study, concluded before October 7, revealed that Jews were the most admired group in the country; d) approximately 70 percent of Americans are pro-Israel; e) the Senate and House passed pro-Israel legislation since October 7; f) the U.S. vetoed anti-Israel proposals at the United Nations Security Council (but has complicated the situation by abstaining on a resolution regarding Gaza); and g) the presidents of Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania were forced to step down because of their tone deafness about antisemitism on their campuses (in addition to charges of serial plagiarism against Claudine Gay). In light of this evidence, one must not rush to judgment on this matter. Furthermore, when the standard metrics used to measure antisemitism (for example, “Would you vote for a Jew?” “Would you marry a Jew?” “Would you want a Jewish neighbor?”) are examined, one finds that there has been a steady decline in anti-Jewish sentiments in the United States.
Of course, as always, there is a deep irony in the Jewish situation. The support of Israel and the prominence of Jews in the U.S. only reinforces the antisemitic canards about “Jewish power” and Protocols of the Elders of Zion type conspiracy theories.
5. Alternatively, while scholars pursue their debates over American exceptionalism there is an essential question that is inseparably linked to their conversation: the changing socio-demographic nature of the American community in its totality. Hispanic immigrants, who now represent a sizeable segment of the overall American population, have shown significant antisemitic attitudes. Among American-born Hispanics, 20 percent of the group reveals such sentiments; among immigrants it is 30 percent. Moreover, there is an ever-growing Muslim population, with a significant Islamist segment, that is now estimated to stand at approximately 3.5 million. In evaluating the significance that the growth of this community will have for Jews, one must confront the fact that migrants from Muslim countries come from areas where Jew-hatred is the norm. Therefore, it is not surprising that this community in America produces activist antisemites like Congresswomen Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar. Plus, as already mentioned, there is extensive, organized Judeophobia in the Black community. Thus, a new and different America is being created day by day.
In addition, a new critical attitude toward Israel now widely exists among younger voters under 29 years of age. While approximately 70 percent of older Americans support Biden’s pro-Israel policy, 18 to 29 year olds, approximately 20 percent of Americans, oppose his pro-Israel position, and nearly 50 percent of 29 year olds and under support the Palestinians. Even more worrying, there has been a statistical decline in support of Israel by young Jews.
6. Within the Jewish community, October 7 has exposed substantial problems of consequence. Foremost is the failure of Jewish Day School education. The Charles Smith High School in Washington, D.C. has seen a group of its graduates publish a letter distancing themselves from Israel and blaming the Israeli state for the events of October 7. The same phenomenon has taken place in a school in Boston. After twelve years of day school education, at the cost of tens of thousands of dollars per student—and major financial support from Jewish Federations—one encounters no meaningful understanding among many day school students of Jewish history, especially regarding the connection between the Jewish people and the land of Israel. There is also the appalling situation in which students of liberal rabbinical seminaries have voiced shocking criticisms of Israel.
This failure has been even more evident, on a broader scale, on college campuses. Jewish college students have been involved in anti-Israel events in universities across the country. Looking at these events though the lens of October 7, one realizes the deep failure they represent relative to the future of the Jewish people. There is something profoundly wrong with the education these students have received, and the values they have been taught—or not taught. If the Jewish community wants to have a future beyond ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox groups, this situation needs to change quickly and fundamentally.
Unfortunately, October 7 has opened a Pandora’s box of very real and immediate challenges of a determinative character.
Steven T. Katz is the Alvin J. and Shirley Slater Professor of Jewish & Holocaust Studies at Boston University. He is a member of the academic committee of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and represents the United States on the academic committee of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). The author of many books and articles, he is presently editing a three-volume Cambridge History of Antisemitism (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
National Security
The events of October 7 radically unsettled, if they did not altogether destroy, defining ideas many people have lived with throughout their entire adult lives. Foremost, and most consequential among them, was the certainty that the state of Israel was militarily secure. Raised on tales of the 1948 and 1967 wars, plus the experience of 1973 and the various intifadas, most Jews and other pro-Israel groups were confident that Israel had constructed a tight defensive cordon around its borders. Now it appears that this view was mistaken and that Israel is more vulnerable than had been appreciated. Clearly Israeli politicians, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his rightwing cabinet, have made a series of fundamental errors in their management of Israel’s defense. Though to be honest, it is not the fault of the Right alone.
Regarding this crucial matter, six things need to be observed:
1. Israel’s radical policies in the West Bank led to the movement of troops away from Gaza. Thus, politics dictated policies involving security, something that should never happen.
2. Israeli intelligence, the almost mythically successful Shin Bet and Mossad, along with other units of Israel’s intelligence program, have been shown to be all too human, with the serious consequence that the intelligence services have lost their crucial intimidation value. The “mystique” linked to Israel’s putative national omniscience in security and intelligence matters has been shattered. The belief that Israel was always one step ahead of Palestinian militants and their allies in Lebanon and Syria, all backed by Iran, was mistaken. So, now, instead of a sense of security, a new, high level of anxiety has been created in Israel (and elsewhere).
3. The policy of Palestinian “containment,” and the strategy of playing the Palestinian Authority off against Hamas, dominant in Israeli military and political planning for the past two decades, has been exposed as a terrible and very costly error.
4. There needs to be a minute, thorough, honest reconsideration of Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians. Israel cannot continue to operate on a plan that only involves domination of the Palestinian people. Principled thought must be given to the topic of how the Palestinians can, or will, respond to Israeli policy. However, at the same time this concern is profoundly problematic because the war has, on the one hand, reinforced Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews, and, on the other, severely hardened Israeli attitudes towards the “Palestinian problem.”
5. Arrogance, as in 1973, has again led Israeli institutions and individuals charged with national security to seriously miscalculate the security situation. We now understand that the Palestinian militias have much greater capacity to do harm than has previously been recognized.
6. Last, but not least, Israel has learned, at great cost, that technology (wired walls topped with video cameras) cannot alone provide the needed security. A new strategy is required.
Thankfully, the IDF has still been strong enough to overcome the nation’s enemies, but the idea of how to provide full Israeli security—elusive as this idea is—needs to be rethought. The Israeli people—and their supporters in the diaspora—do not want to live in a situation where Israel’s defense continually involves the type of massive intervention that we have been witnessing in Gaza for the past six months.
Moreover, this concern for the safety of Israel has profound implications for the way forward at the end of the current conflict in Gaza. The United States and many European countries are now projecting a postwar situation that will include the creation of a Palestinian state, the long-discussed “two-state solution.” But given the lethal structure that Hamas, under close observation by Israel, was able to create in Gaza, what kind of threat would an independent Palestine state represent? Can one possibly assure the demilitarization of such a state? In considering this subject, it must always be remembered that Israelis need not only to be safe but to feel safe. Otherwise, who will stay in the country? Also, is it reasonable, given Hamas’ basic beliefs and stated threats toward the Jewish state, to assume that they will agree to recognize the existence of such a state?
The events that led up to this war, that continue to exist during the war, and, probably, will be the case after the war, are set against the background of a profoundly divided Israeli body politic. The events of October 7 have made the highly corrosive corruption in Israeli politics even more evident. More specifically, it has revealed how existing radicalized and dishonorable political circumstances have profound implications for national security. Prime Minister Netanyahu and his rightwing and religious allies have nearly completely abandoned any concern with, and for, the general good. Of course, it is to be understood that different constituencies will, unfortunately, define the “general good” in self-interested ways.
There is an urgent need for an end to the selfish ideological politics now dominating the Israeli government, as well as the looting of the national treasury (budget) by the Haredi segment of the population. Aside from the absolute need to win the current war—recognizing that what this entails and what this legitimates is not altogether clear—the issue of political integrity and responsibility is the most pressing internal matter now facing the Jewish state.
The American Jewish Community
The second major concern that has arisen after October 7 relates to the condition of the American Jewish community, in particular, the relationship between it and other groups and organizations in America. Related to this highly complex topic, I would make six comments.
1. The shocking, overwhelming, and unanticipated anti-Israel and antisemitic reaction to the war indicates that the leadership of major Jewish organizations failed to correctly understand the nature of the relationship existing between American Jewry and other communities in the United States. Almost entirely focused on the dangers posed by the extreme-right, mainstream Jewish leaders seriously underestimated, and were virtually silent about, the antisemitism extant in the Black, Muslim, and “woke” communities.
Simply put, the diverse relationships between the Jewish community and the Black and Muslim communities have been badly mismanaged by Jewish leaders because the governing Jewish strategy was based on the notion that Jewish support of Black and Muslim American agendas would be met with reciprocal support for the Jewish community. In fact, this understanding of the dialectic of outreach has now been shown to be seriously mistaken as the most vociferous anti-Israel response to October 7 has come from these groups of people.
The same applies to the “progressives,” whose invention and propagation of Diversity, Equity, Inclusion (DEI) and Critical Race Theory throughout the entire American educational system, and beyond, is, and will be, enormously destructive to Jewish interests. These paradigms divide American society into oppressed and oppressor groups, and the Jews are defined as “white adjacents” and thus oppressors. DEI’s demand for equal results instead of the classic liberal ideal of equal opportunities means, by definition, that Jews will be denied professorial appointments, spots on corporate boards, and in many other places. Most especially, DEI has already shown itself to yield highly negative results for Jews on colleges campuses. This issue is, however, many-sided as the role of an ethos of diversity must be understood, i.e., many previously unrepresented minorities are now in play. Thus, diversity is not, per se, antisemitism. However, in many instances the two have come together to create specific examples of toxic opinion and behavior. Given the great importance of education to Jewish success in America, this is a matter that needs to be closely scrutinized.
2. In light of what has occurred, there needs to be an understanding of, and a “zero tolerance” for, Muslim, Black, and “woke” antisemitism. Yes, there is a difference to be made between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, but all too often a double standard singles out Israel for wrongs that involve the recycling of traditional antisemitic themes, for example, the “Blood Libel,” that are directed only at Israel.
3. More broadly, Jews and non-Jews alike have been shocked by the outpouring of raw hatred in American society, most notably on college campuses. However, it is important to appreciate that most non-Jewish students and non-Jewish faculty did not participate in this explosion of antisemitism. Yet it is also important to recognize that those responsible for making policy at higher education institutions have often treated antisemitism and the abuse of Jewish students with a less stringent standard than is applied in other instances of prejudice. What would never be tolerated vis-à-vis Black students, or gay students, is regularly—one might almost say normatively—tolerated where Jewish students are concerned. Harvard would never allow a public attack on students in any of the non-Jewish groups just mentioned, but when its president was asked about the tolerance of talk of “genocide” of the Jews, her reply was “it depends on the context.” The “wokism” that has come to dominate colleges and universities must be openly and vigorously opposed by lawsuits and government agencies.
4. With regard to the larger topic of American “exceptionalism,” it is evident that this notion needs to be further explored and re-examined when it comes to the treatment of Jews, because it has very real consequences. Such a review will unavoidably influence how the Jewish community and individual Jews invest their time and resources and respond to the question of aliyah. Many have already decided that the current outpouring of antisemitism is clear proof against the “exceptionalism” thesis. But, upon careful reflection, the relevant evidence here is, in fact, much more ambiguous. For even with the many current expressions of Jew hatred, America represents a significant deviation from prior historical Jewish experience. In defense of exceptionalism one needs to note: a) President Biden has publicly declared that he is a Zionist; b) the number of Jewish senators and congressmen who support Israel is disproportionally high; c) a recent Pew study, concluded before October 7, revealed that Jews were the most admired group in the country; d) approximately 70 percent of Americans are pro-Israel; e) the Senate and House passed pro-Israel legislation since October 7; f) the U.S. vetoed anti-Israel proposals at the United Nations Security Council (but has complicated the situation by abstaining on a resolution regarding Gaza); and g) the presidents of Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania were forced to step down because of their tone deafness about antisemitism on their campuses (in addition to charges of serial plagiarism against Claudine Gay). In light of this evidence, one must not rush to judgment on this matter. Furthermore, when the standard metrics used to measure antisemitism (for example, “Would you vote for a Jew?” “Would you marry a Jew?” “Would you want a Jewish neighbor?”) are examined, one finds that there has been a steady decline in anti-Jewish sentiments in the United States.
Of course, as always, there is a deep irony in the Jewish situation. The support of Israel and the prominence of Jews in the U.S. only reinforces the antisemitic canards about “Jewish power” and Protocols of the Elders of Zion type conspiracy theories.
5. Alternatively, while scholars pursue their debates over American exceptionalism there is an essential question that is inseparably linked to their conversation: the changing socio-demographic nature of the American community in its totality. Hispanic immigrants, who now represent a sizeable segment of the overall American population, have shown significant antisemitic attitudes. Among American-born Hispanics, 20 percent of the group reveals such sentiments; among immigrants it is 30 percent. Moreover, there is an ever-growing Muslim population, with a significant Islamist segment, that is now estimated to stand at approximately 3.5 million. In evaluating the significance that the growth of this community will have for Jews, one must confront the fact that migrants from Muslim countries come from areas where Jew-hatred is the norm. Therefore, it is not surprising that this community in America produces activist antisemites like Congresswomen Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar. Plus, as already mentioned, there is extensive, organized Judeophobia in the Black community. Thus, a new and different America is being created day by day.
In addition, a new critical attitude toward Israel now widely exists among younger voters under 29 years of age. While approximately 70 percent of older Americans support Biden’s pro-Israel policy, 18 to 29 year olds, approximately 20 percent of Americans, oppose his pro-Israel position, and nearly 50 percent of 29 year olds and under support the Palestinians. Even more worrying, there has been a statistical decline in support of Israel by young Jews.
6. Within the Jewish community, October 7 has exposed substantial problems of consequence. Foremost is the failure of Jewish Day School education. The Charles Smith High School in Washington, D.C. has seen a group of its graduates publish a letter distancing themselves from Israel and blaming the Israeli state for the events of October 7. The same phenomenon has taken place in a school in Boston. After twelve years of day school education, at the cost of tens of thousands of dollars per student—and major financial support from Jewish Federations—one encounters no meaningful understanding among many day school students of Jewish history, especially regarding the connection between the Jewish people and the land of Israel. There is also the appalling situation in which students of liberal rabbinical seminaries have voiced shocking criticisms of Israel.
This failure has been even more evident, on a broader scale, on college campuses. Jewish college students have been involved in anti-Israel events in universities across the country. Looking at these events though the lens of October 7, one realizes the deep failure they represent relative to the future of the Jewish people. There is something profoundly wrong with the education these students have received, and the values they have been taught—or not taught. If the Jewish community wants to have a future beyond ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox groups, this situation needs to change quickly and fundamentally.
Unfortunately, October 7 has opened a Pandora’s box of very real and immediate challenges of a determinative character.
Steven T. Katz is the Alvin J. and Shirley Slater Professor of Jewish & Holocaust Studies at Boston University. He is a member of the academic committee of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and represents the United States on the academic committee of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). The author of many books and articles, he is presently editing a three-volume Cambridge History of Antisemitism (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).